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I.

PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING

The parties to

is proceeding are:

John Call:

Plaintiff/Appellant

Clark Jenkins:

Plaintiff/Appellant

City of West Jordan:

Defendant/Respondent
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II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(h) provides the Utah Court
of Appeals Jurisdiction of this appeajj.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court erred in refusing to

enter a judgment on plaintiff's civil rights claimf effectively dismissing plaintiffs' civil rights claim.
2.

Whether the lower court erred in failing to

try plaintiffs' civil right claim.
3.

Whether the lower court erred in refusing to

award plaintiffs' attorney fees.
4.

Whether the lower court erred in refusing to

award plaintiffs the costs paid by plaintiffs to a courtappointed master.
5.

Whether the lower court erred in failing to

award plaintiffs the costs incurred in auditing the defendant 's records.
6.

Whether the lower court erred in failing to

join other subdividers as party plaintiffs.

1

IV.
S 1983.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights
Every

person

who,

under

color

of

any

statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be

subjected, any citizen of

the United

States

or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any

rights,

privileges,

or

immunities

secured

by

the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in

an

action

at

law,

suit

proceeding for redress.

in

equity,

or

other

proper

For the purposes of this section,

any Act of Congress applicable, exclusively to the District
of

Columbia

shall

be

considered

to be a statute

of

the

District of Columbia.

§ 1988.

Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights
The

jurisdiction

in

civil

and

criminal

matters

conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this
Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES,"
for the protection of all persons in the United States in
their

civil

rights, and

exercised and enforced

for

their

vindication,

shall

be

in conformity with the laws of the

United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
2

same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it
is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on
the party

found guilty.

In any action or proceeding to

enforce a provision of sections 197*^, 1978, 1979, 1980 and
1981 of the Revised Statutes

[42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985,

1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 USCS §§ 1691 et
seq.], or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf
of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a
violation

of, a provision

of

the

United

States

Internal

Revenue Code [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 USCS §§ 2000det seq.], the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.

3

Amendment 14:

Section 1* Citizens of the United States.

All

persons

born

or

naturalized

in

the

United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the

privileges

States;

nor

or

shall

immunities

of

citizens

any State deprive

of

the

any person

United

of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a final "Ruling and Order of
Judgment"

denying

plaintiffs'

motion

for

the

entry

of

judgment on their civil rights claim and denying plaintiffs
an

attorney's

plaintiffs'

fee

motions

award.
to

The

join

lower

other

court

also

subdividers

as

denied
party

plaintiffs and plaintiffs' request for costs incurred by the
plaintiffs in paying a court-appointed master and a CPA to
audit West Jordan's records.
A statement of the facts helpful and relevant to
the issues presented for review are as follows:

4

1.

Subdividers

John

Call

and

Clark

Jenkins

(hereafter "Call and Jenkins") sued the respondent City of
West

Jordan

requiring
proposed

("City")

subdividers
subdivision

challenging
to

dedicate

land

to

the

equivalent of the land value in cash.

the

City's

seven
city

percent
or

to

ordinance
of

the

pay

the

The land or cash was

to be used by the city for flood control and/or park and
recreational facilities.
2.

(R.2-11, 118-121.)

The Third Judicial District Court upheld the

ordinance and the subdividers

apnealed.

(R. 14 2,14 3,144,

151,153.)
3.

The Utah Supreme Court, Call v. West Jordan,

606 P.2d 217, (Utah 1979) (hereinafter Call I) affirmed and
remanded

(R.162-173.) (Copy of case attached as Addendum 1.)
4.

On rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court, Call v.

West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) (hereinafter Call II)
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face,
but remanded the case to give the subdividers an opportunity
to present evidence that the payment required of them did not
have any reasonable

relationship

to the City's needs for

flood control or parks and recreational facilities. (R. 40106, 696-98./)

(Copy of case attached as Addendum 2.)
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5.

Thereafter,

the

trial

court

allowed

the

subdividers to amend their complaint to include claims (1)
that

the ordinance was

invalid

because

the city did

not

follow statutory notice and hearing requirements in enacting
the ordinance; and (2) a civil rights claim alleging that the
subdividers rights to due process were denied by the city's
failure to provide the required notice and public hearing.
(R.306, 307-19,323,329,339,343.)
6.

Thereafter,

the

City

defended

against

the

amended allegations by stating that it had complied with the
notice and hearing requirements.

(R.1850-55.)

The City also

alleged it was immune from the civil rights claim. (R.1916,
1919.)
7.

On the third appeal, the Utah Supreme Court,

Call v. West Jordan 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) (hereafter Call
III) , upheld

the

lower

court's

allowance

of

the

amended

complaint. The Utah Supreme Court also ruled that the city
failed

to

comply

with

hearing requirements.

the

statutory

Because the City

notice

and

public

failed to hold a

public hearing, with notice, the court held the ordinance was
void ab initio.

The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to

the lower court to enter judgment consistent with the opinion
(R.1843-45.)

(Copy of case attached as Addendum 3.)
6

8.

Subsequently,

the lower court denied plain-

tiffs' (1) motion for entry of judgment on plaintiffs' civil
rights claim; (2) claim for attorney fees; (3) motion to join
other subdividers as party plaintiffs; and

(4) motion for

costs paid by the plaintiffs for a court-appointed master and
an audit of West Jordan's records.

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
West

Jordan

deprived

Call

and

Jenkins

of their

procedural rights to due process by failing to provide notice
and a public hearing prior to legislating the seven percent
impact fee ordinance and prior to taking Call's and Jenkin's
money.

In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court held that West

Jordan failed to provide notice and a public hearing.

The

lower court erred in failing to enter a judgment in favor of
the subdividers on their civil rights claim.
Entering a civil rights judgment in favor of Call
and Jenkins was not prohibited by Call III. Rather, such a
judgment would be totally consistent with Call Ill's opinion.
Call III ruled that since West Jordan did not hold a public
hearing, the seven percent impact fee ordinance was void ab
initio and ,Call and Jenkins were entitled to a judgment.

7

Because Call and Jenkins are entitled to a § 1983
civil rights judgment against West Jordan, this case should
be remanded for consideration of attorney fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.
West Jordan violated Rule 11 when it continued to
advocate that an August 27, 1974 master plan meeting was the
public

hearing

required

procedural due process.
pleadings

and

warranted

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

§10-9-25

and

That assertion, made in numerous

documents,
law.

by

was

In Call

not

grounded

in

fact

nor

III/ the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
One's imagination must be stretched
beyond rational limits to accept the
master plan hearing as satisfying the
public hearing requirements.
Call III at 183.
Because

West

should be remanded

Jordan violated

Rule

11, the case

to the lower court with directions to

enter a judgment awarding plaintiffs a reasonable attorney's
fee and plaintiffs' costs incurred in paying an accountant
and court appointed master to examine West Jordan's books.
call and Jenkins are entitled to have the master's
fees taxes as costs because they are the prevailing party and
because West Jordan's failure to answer simple interrogatories necessitated the reference.
8

3A J. Moore & J. Lucas,

Moore's Federal Practice, para- 53.04[1] (2d ed. 1987).

For

similar reasons, plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for
the cost of their accountant's examination of West Jordan's
slip shod records.

Andrecikopoulo j v. Broadmoor Mgt. Co. ,

670 P-2d 435 (Colo. App. 1983).
The lower court erred in failing to grant Call and
Jenkins's motion to join, as party plaintiffs, other subdividers who paid impact fees.

In Call I, the Utah Supreme

Court

and

found

that

the

monies

subdividers was a trust fund.

property

paid

by

the

In Call III the same court

held that the impact fee ordinance establishing

the trust

fund was void from the beginning.
Once the trust

failed, only the subdividers had

ownership interests in the impact fee trust fund.
interested

in

a

trust

fund

are

indispensable

Persons
parties.

Hiltsey v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).

VII.
A.

1.

ARGUMENT

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SUBDIVIDERS
ON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

Factual and Procedural Background.
After Call II, the trial court allowed Call and

Jenkins to amend their complaint to include claims that: (1)
9

the city did not hold a public hearing prior to enacting the
ordinance; and (2) plaintiffs' civil rights were violated by
the

City's

hearing.

failure

to

provide

the

required

notice

and

(R.306,307-19,323,329,339,343.)
Trial was held on September 1, 2, and November 18

of 1982-

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, the

defendant prior to putting on its case in chief moved to
dismiss

plaintiffs'

complaint-

The

court

granted

the

defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, no cause
of action.

(R.1216-1217, 1492-93.)

Plaintiffs appealed.

In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally
found that there was no notice and there was no hearing and
remanded

the

case

court's opinion.

2.

to

enter

judgment

Call III at 183-184.

consistent

with

(See Addendum 3.)

Legal Analysis.
The applicable civil rights statute provides:
Every person who under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation
custom
or usage of any state . . . subjects
or
causes to
be
subjected
any
citizen . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or amenities secured
by the constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the parties injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
10

the

The purpose
compensate

persons

constitutional

of

for

rights.

the

civil

injury

rights

caused

by

statute

is to

deprivation

Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d

of
468

(10th Cir. 1985) .
There are two and only two elements to a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983f both of which unquestionably
exist in this case:

(1) a citizen must have been denied a

federal right; and (2) the denial must have been under the
color of state law.

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640

(1980).
It is absolutely clear that the actions of West
Jordan

in

passing

the

seven

percent

ordinance

and

in

collecting the fees from the subdividers were actions taken
under the color of state law.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

184 (1961) (misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law
made

possible

only

because

authority of state law").

the

wrongdoer

is

"with

the

It is when the execution of a

governmental policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may
represent

official

policy,

inflicts

fairly be said to

the injury, that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Monell

v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
11

The

city's

collection

of

the seven percent

fee

was clearly a deprivation of property within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
purposes.

Cash is property for due process

Coleman v. Turpin, 697 F.2d 1341 1344 (10th Cir.

1982) .
The only

remaining

issue

is whether

plaintiff's

rights to procedural due process were denied by the city.
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in
a

meaningful

process.

way

are

the

very

heart

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669

P.2d

of

procedural

1207, 1211

due
(Utah

1983).
[Elvery significant deprivation whether
permanent or temporary of any interest
which is qualified as
property
under
the
due
process clause must be
proceeded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case . . . .
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980).
In Call IIIf the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally
found that there was no notice and no hearing.
[W]e hold that because the statute calls
for a public hearing, our legislature
contemplated something more than a
regular city counsel meeting held . . .
without specific advance notice to the
public that the proposed ordinance would
be considered.
Call III at 183.
12

Notice to be effective must alert the
public to the nature and scope of the
ordinance that is being adopted.
Call III at 183.
One's imagination must be stretched
beyond
reasonable
limits to
accept
the master plan hearing as satisfying the
public hearing requirement . . . .
The
ordinance was not even drafted until
months after the master plan public
hearing.
Call III at 182.
There is no dispute that West Jordan, acting under
color of state law, took $16,576 of the subdivider's property
without notice and without the hearing required by statute
and by the due process clause.

Thus, West Jordan, undeniab-

ly, deprived Call and Jenkins of their procedural rights to
due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The

denial

of

due

process

in

this

case,

is

analytically similar to the denial of due process in Adler v.
Lynch,

415

plaintiff

F.Supp.
received

705
no

(D. Neb.
notice

1976).

that

the

In Adler, the
zoning

variance

previously granted to her would be reviewed by the board of
commissioners at one of the board's regular meetings.
that meeting, the board rescinded the variance.

As a result,

the court stated:
It seems clear
plaintiff has

to the court that the
been subjected to a
13

At

deprivation of due process of law by
being
denied proper notice of an
opportunity to effectively participate in
the proceedings of December 18.
Adler at 711.
The present case is also analytically parallel to
Lavicky

v.

Lavicky,

Burnett, 758

the

state

because

it believed

stolen.

The court

F.2d

seized

468

the

(10th Cir.

plaintiff's

1985).

pickup

In
truck

some of the parts of the truck were
found

a violation

of

the

plaintiff's

procedural due process rights when the state disposed of the
truck without following the statutory procedure for determining ownership of the allegedly stolen property prior to its
disposition.

Lavicky at 473.

In a similar manner, West

Jordan violated the plaintiff's procedural due process rights
when it required the plaintiff to pay a fee that was not
justified

because

the

city

had

not

followed

statutory

procedures.
The fact that the subdividers received a refund of
their money does not redress their procedural due process
rights.
[A] deprivation of procedural due process
is an independent constitutional tort
actionable under § 1983 with or without
proof of actual injury.

14

Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1978); see also
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978).
In summary, the Utah Supreme Court previously, in
this case, found that there was no notice and no public
hearing.

There is no dispute that West Jordan acted under

color of state law when it deprived the subdividers of their
$16,576.

The subdividers were entitled to judgment in their

favor on their § 1983 civil rights claim.

B.

1.

THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
CONSIDERATION OP ATTORNEY FEES
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Call and Jenkins are Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Because the subdividers are entitled to a judgment

on their civil rights claim, they are also entitled to have
the court consider their claim for attorney fees pursuant to
Section 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

That section provides that in any

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections [42
U.S.C. § 1983] the court may, in its discretion, allow the
prevailing party other than the United State a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs
Even if only nominal damages are recovered, it does
not diminish the plaintiff's eligibility for attorney fees
under § 1988.

Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The
plaintiff's

reason

the

application

lower

for

court

attorney

did

not

consider

fees pursuant

to 42

U.S.C. § 1988/ is because it was under the mistaken impression that it did not have authority under Call III to enter a
judgment on a civil rights claim-

(Transcript Proceedings,

September 11, 1987, pp.16-19, hereafter "Tw.)

(T.pp.16-17.)

In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
remand

this

case

to

the

trial

consistent with this opinion."

court

to

"We

enter

judgment

Call III at 184.

When an

appellate court remands a case to the trial court, the issues
decided upon appeal cannot be acted upon or decided contrary
to

the

way

they

were

decided

in

the

appellate

court.

However, new issues may be raised so long as they do not
cover issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court.
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191
P.2d 153 (1948).

see generally Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d

180,

1986).

181

(Utah

On

remand,

the

lower

court

has

jurisdiction to take any action as justice may require under
the circumstances, as long as it is not inconsistent with the
mandate

and

judgment

of

the

appellate

court.

Lumbar Co. v. Torborq, 80 N.W.2d 461 (Wis. 1957).

Fullerton
It is the

trial court's duty to rule on issues not ruled upon by the

16

Utah Supreme Court.

Eckard v. Smith, 545 P. 2d 501 (Utah

1976) •
In this case, the mandate to the lower court was
only to enter judgment consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion.

Call III at 184.

Because the Supreme Court held
i

that the ordinance was invalid for the City's failure to hold
a hearing, recovery for violation of procedural due process
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate.

In

fact, the finding that the City acted contrary to statutory
procedures

is elemental

rights claim.
Cir. 1985).

to

the

plaintiff's

§

1983

civil

see Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th
The lower court erred when it reasoned that it

did not have authority to rule on Call's and Jenkins's due
process claim.
In Shapiro Burnstein & Co. v. Jerry Voqle Music
Co. , 161 F.2d 406 (2nd Cir. 1947), ^.he court used the same
language contained in Call III in reversing and remanding a
judgment in a copyright infringement action relating to a
1912 copyright.

In clarifying its prior opinion, the court

noted that it had not discussed any question related to a
1914

renewal

of

a

copyright.

However,

the

remand

and

mandate did not bar the district court from reconsidering an

17

initial ruling on the 1914 renewal.

Explaining the lower

courts' powers on remand, the appellate court stated:
We reversed the judgment, remanding the
case for entry of a judgment consistent
with this opinion.
This permits the
district judge to enter any judgment
which he thinks is consistent with our
opinion.
He may consider whether the
1914 version was a joint work or a new
work and whether the principals enunciated with respect to the 1912 version
are likewise applicable to the 1919
version.
Similarly,

the Utah Supreme Court

permitted

the

lower court to enter any judgment consistent with Call III.
The court could and should have considered whether the City's
failure to hold a hearing deprived Call and Jenkins of their
constitutional rights to due process.
ment

for the Utah Supreme Court

lower court to enter

There is no require-

to specifically tell the

judgment on the civil rights claim.

Rather, the lower court was required to consider all issues
not

ruled

upon

on

the

appeal

and

to

enter

consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.

a

judgment

Under these

facts, the lower court erred when it ruled it could not enter
judgment on the civil rights claim because the Utah Supreme
Court had not specifically ordered the lower court to do so.
This court' should remand

the case

18

to the trial

judge to

enable him to exercise his discretion on the attorney's fee
application.

C.

1.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY
FEES PURSUANT TO U.R.C.P. 11

Factual Background.
After plaintiffs amended their complaint, a core

issue was whether or not a public hearing had been held.
West Jordan claimed that a meeting of August 27, 1974 was the
public hearing.

It is true that the August 27, 1974 meeting

was a public hearing.

However, it was a public hearing on a

different issue (master plan).

Neither at trial, nor in any

post-trial proceeding, has West Jordan ever cited a scintilla of evidence to show that the August
hearing"

was

on

the

subject

of

the

27, 1974

seven

"public

percent

Indeed, at the close of the trial, the judge stated:

fee.
"There

was no evidence given to the court about a public hearing."
(T. Sept. 2, 1982 at p.72.)
In Call III, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
One's imagination must be stretched
beyond rational limits to accept the
master plan public hearing as satisfying
the public hearing requirements of §10-925.
Call III, at p.183.
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2.

Legal Analysis.
Rule

requires

that

11

of

every

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

pleading, motion

and

other

paper

be

signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name.

Th^ signature of that attorney constitutes a certifi-

cate by him that
paper

and

that

(1) he has read the pleading, motion or
to

the

best

of

his

knowledge

and

after

reasonable inquiry (2) the pleadingf motion or paper is well
grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument

for

the

extension, modification

existing

law

and

(3) that

it

is not

or

reversal

interposed

of

for any

improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
penalty

for

signing

the

pleading,

motion

or

paper

The
in

violation of these three requirements include a reasonable
attorney's fee.

If the pleading was signed in bad faith,

Rule 11 requires that sanctions be enclosed.
A refusal to invoke Rule 11 sanctions constitutes
error as a matter of law.
F.2d

Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770

1168, 1174, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); F.R.C.P. Rule 26,

Advisory Committee Note.

The sufficiency of a pleading or

motion and the determination to impose sanctions are reviewed
20

under a de novo standard-

Donaldsen v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1581

(11th Cir. 1987); Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985).
In the present case, the West Jordan City attorney
signed the following papers asserting that West Jordan held a
public hearing after the drafting of %he ordinance and prior
to its adoption by West Jordan City:
to Plaintiff's

Complaint

dated April

Answer of West Jordan
7, 1981; Answers to

Plaintiff's Interrogatories dated March 16, 1982; Defendant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment dated April 6, 1982; and Defendant's
Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
In each instance, it was asserted that West Jordan
had

held

the

required

public

hearing, but

at

trial, no

evidence whatsoever was put on that a public hearing had been
held.

The

pleadings, motions

and

papers

were

not well

grounded in fact and the West Jordan Attorney knew it.
This case is analytically comparable to Frasier v.
Cast, 771 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1985).

frasier involved a civil

rights action arising out of a warrantless entry to a house.
As a defense, the defendant alleged the entry to the house
was

warraated

under

the

circumstances.

At

trial,

the

deputy's testimony indicated that he was not motivated bv
21

emergency but that he was concerned with preserving another
officer's life.
The trial court, after reviewing the facts, was
convinced the court appellant's counsel could not reasonably
have

believed

his

own

case

and

awarded

attorney

fees.

Similarly, in the present case, the West Jordan attorney must
have known that West

Jordan's public

hearing defense was

frivolous, and attorney fees should be awarded.
Not content with only constructing

defenses

not

well grounded in fact, the West Jordan Attorney, subsequent
to Call III, began making assertions not grounded in law.

He

argued that West Jordan was immune from civil rights claims
and told the court,
because . . .

"I am

familiar

with these things

I as city attorney have to pay attention to

these things."

What he didn't tell the court was that the

United States Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980) squarely held that cities (West Jordan)
have no immunity, none, whatsoever.
Jordan's

conduct,

researching

and

plaintiffs'

responding

to

As a result of West

attorney
the

Plaintiffs should be awarded attorney

spent

immunity
fees.

five

hours

allegations.
(R.1916-1919.)

c. f. Rodqers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194
(7th Cir. 1985) .
22

In summary, plaintiffs
fees pursuant to U.R.C.P. 11.
with

instructions

to

the

are entitled

to attorney

The case should be remanded

lower

coiirt

to

determine

the

reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded.

D.

THE CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR JOINDER
OF THE INDISPENSABLE PARTY SUBDIVIDERS

In Call I, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
impact

fees paid by the subdividers

Jordan was a trust fund.

to the City of West

The court said:

These observations are also pertinent:
Although the money collected from the
plaintiff in this case was deposited in
the City's general fundf it should not be
assumed that the money thus becomes
usable for other purposes by the City
and it is of no special benefit to the
areas sought to be subdivided. On the
contrary that it will be used for its
stated purpose is assured . . . by the
fact that the recognized principal is
that if money is collected from the
public for a specific purpose, it becomes
a trust fund committed to the carrying
out of that purpose. (Emphasis added.)
Call I at 320.
In Call III/ the Utah Supreme Court held that West
Jordan's impact fee ordinance was void ab initio:
We therefore hold that the West Jordan
C;ity Ordinance 33, §9-C-8(2) (1975) is
invalid and void ab initio.
Call III at 183.
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The Supreme Court having first found that the paid
impact fees were a trust fund, and then having declared the
Ordinance

creating

the

fund

as void

from

the beginning,

raises the issue of who owns the fund when the trust fails
for illegality.
of the trust

The unequivocal answer is that the settlors

(the subdividers) own the fund.

see In Re:

Professional Air Traffic Controller Organization, 724 F.2d
205 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In Re: Mooney's Estate, 267 N.W. 197
(Neb.

1936); see generally Bell v. Harrison, 498 P.2d 397

(Ore. 1972).

When the trust fails, the settlors are entitled

to the trust property.
Trusts

and

Trustees

G. Bogert & G. Bogert, the Law of

§468

(Rev.2d

Ed.

1977);

Restatement

(Second) Trusts §411 (1984).
The

subdividers

are

the

only

persons

who

are

entitled to the West Jordan impact fee trust fund.
To protect the interests of the subdividers in the
impact fee trust fund, plaintiffs Call and Jenkins filed the
lawsuit as a class action.

In Call III, the Supreme Court

disallowed the class because the size of the class was too
small.

The court said:
[W]e are here dealing with a class whose
members have been identified.
They are
developers engaged in business whose
claims are not so insubstantial that
joinder or individual suits would not
merit the cost . . . Given the facts of
24

this case, we cannot hold the trial court
abused its discretion in denying class
action status.
Call III, supra at 183-84.
Clearly,

the

foregoing

language

shows

the

Utah

Supreme Court anticipated the subdividers would subsequently
be joined in this action.
The Utah Supreme Court's expectation is consistent
with the framework set out in Rules 19 and 23 of the Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

Rules

i9 and

23 provide the

framework for joining indispensable parties before the court.
Rule 19 provides for the joinder of indispensable parties but
states that the rule is subject to the class action provisions of Rule 23 (U.R.C.P. 19(d)).

There is no need to join

parties under rule 19 if the case proceeds as a class action
under Rule 23.

see Matthies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d

Cir. 1959); Stevens v. Lumis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.9 (1st Cir.
1964).
Consistent with

the

foregoing

authority

and the

expectations of the Utah Supreme Court, Call and Jenkins,
subsequent to the Call III remand, moved the court to join
subdividers who paid impact fees as party plaintiffs in the
above-entitled action.

Because the subdividers were the only

one's who had an interest in the West Jordan impact fee trust
25

fund, they were indispensable parties.

A complete accounting

or restoration of the trust assets could not be made without
them.

see Wash v Centeino, 692 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982);

Matthies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959); G. Bogert
and G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §522 at 36, (Rev. 2nd
ed. .1978);

3A

J.

Moore

and

J.

Lucas,

Moore's

Federal

Practice, para- 1908 at 19-170, (2d ed, 1982).
The

court's

failure

to

grant

the

motion

is

reversible error and requires this case to be remanded for
joinder of those (subdividers) who have an interest in that
fund.

Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).
A case analytically similar to this one

is Cass

Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 63 F.R.D. 34
(D.S.D. 1974).

In that case, the plaintiffs were customers

of an electric company.
electric

company

made

municipal ordinances.
overcharge.

The plaintiffs claimed that the
rate

increases

in

violation

of

The plaintiffs sought a refund of the

The case was brought as a class action.

The

court ruled that all customers of the electric company were
indispensable parties under F.R.C.P. 19.

The court reasoned:

If Cass Clay remained in federal court
and succeeded in obtaining a judgment, a
distribution plan would have to be
formulated.
In order to determine how
much is due and owing to Cass Clay, this
court would have to determine how much
26

was due and owing to each individual
class member.
The fund is constant and
each individual class member's share is
dependent upon their share owing to every
other class member.
* * *

I think those class members are indispensable according to that rule.
•

•

•

It is therefore the co
court that the interests of the utility
customers in the fund . . . are joint,
common and undivided.
Cass Clay at 37,39.
Further,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

Hiltsey

v.

Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), remanded a case to join as
an indispensable party a trust beneficiary not before the
court.

Similarly, this court should remand this case to join

all the subdividers who have an interest in the West Jordan
impact fee trust fund.
D.

1.

* THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
COSTS PAID BY THE PLAINTIFFS TO
COURT APPOINTED MASTER AND FOR THE
AUDIT OF WEST JORDAN'S BOOKS

Factual and Procedural Background.
During the litigation and before the lower court

ruled on tfre issue of class certification, plaintiffs served
a set of interrogatories

on West Jordan City asking West
27

Jordan to identify which subdividers paid impact fees to West
Jordan,

how

subdivider's

much

was

money.

paid

and

what

was

done

The defendant refused

with

the

to answer the

simple interrogatories and said:
The answers to these interrogatories may
be determined or ascertained from the
business records of the City of West
Jordan or from an examination, audit or
inspection of such business records and
the burden of discovery in ascertaining
the answers is substantially the same for
the plaintiff as the defendant.
(R.187-188.)
Thereafter, plaintiff sent CPA Gerald Sharkey to
examine the business records.

He discovered:

1.

Not all of the business records were
available.

2.

The business records consisted of 34 boxes
commingled with police reports and other
irrelevant documents.

3.

Some documents were in a safe.

4.

Some documents were in an employee's lounge.

(R.749-750.)
He determined
detailed

records

that West Jordan did

related

to

fixed

asset

not maintain

account

groups

contrary to the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act and the West
Jordan
various

answer
motions

to

interrogatories.

to compel, the
28

lower

(R.349-350.)

After

court, appointed

a

master to determine who paid what to the City of West Jordan
and what was done with the money.
[T]he master shall examine the records
of West
Jordan and determine the
consideration paid for each subdivider
and the subdivider's compliance with West
Jordan's flood control afid park fee
ordinance, the subject of t^is lawsuit.
(R.427.)

The

Master's

report

affidavit of Gerald Sharkey.

was

consistent

with

the

The Master concluded that the

impact fee should have had special accounting treatment and
that

there

should

have

been

a

description of all fixed assets.

fixed

asset

ledger

and

(R.432-442.)

Because the information sought by Call and Jenkins
was

not

in the documents

identified

by West

Jordan, and

because the Master, after examining the records, could not
tell what was done with the impact fees, the court punished
West Jordan by requiring the City to prove how it "spent the
7 percent subdivision fees paid by plaintiffs."

(R.1030-

1032.)
After the final remand of this case, plaintiffs
sought to have taxed against West Jordan, the costs of the
court

appointed

master which

was

plaintiffs paid in accounting fees.
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$1,495, and

the

$4,650

2.

Legal Analysis,

(a)

Master's Fees.
Master's fees are determined in connection with a

bill of costs.
F.R.D.

100

United States v. Yonkers Bd of Ed., 108

(S.D.N.Y.

discretion, they

1985).

While

the courts

have some

uniformly impose the master's fee either

upon the losing party.

Capra, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 507

F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), or upon the party whose conduct
necessitated

the

reference.

3A

J.

Moore

and

J.

Moore's Federal Practice, para. 53.04[1] at 53-56
1987).

Lucas

(2d ed.

In this case, both factors show that the master's fee

should have been imposed upon West Jordan City.
Call and Jenkins are the prevailing parties.
the master's
losing party.

Thus,

fee should be imposed upon West Jordan, the
In K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471

(9th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff prevailed on only two of his
twelve claims but the court held that the judgment rendered
on those two claims made plaintiffs the prevailing party and
allowed

plaintiff

to

recover,

as

costs,

the

plaintiffs paid toward the master's compensation.

amount

the

Similarly,

in this case, while plaintiff did not prevail on all of its
claims, it/did prevail on obtaining a judgment against the
City of West Jordan for the impact fees paid.
30

The expense of

the master should be imposed upon West Jordan, the losing
party•
Further, it was the conduct of West Jordan that
necessitated
rogatories

appointment

submitted

difficult.
fees

the

of

the master.

The

inter-

to the City of West Jordan were not

They asked who paid what fees and how were the

spent.

West

Jordan

refused

to

answer

the

interrogatories and directed the plaintiffs to its business
records.

The business records were in such a slip shod form,

it was impossible for the plaintiffs' accountant to perform
an accurate audit.

The court then appointed a master.

The

master discovered that he too could not locate the information within West Jordan's records.

After that, the court

correctly placed the burden on West Jordan to prove what it
did with the money.
If West Jordan had answered tne interrogatories,
the

expenses

of

a master

would

not

have

been

incurred.

Similarly, if West Jordan had not violated Rule 11 as stated
in Part

VII

C

of

this brief, plaintiffs

incurred the expense of a master.

31

would

not have

(b)

Accountant Costs.
A similar analysis dictates that the court should

award plaintiff the costs of its accountant in inspecting the
recordscosts

While expert fees are not generally recoverable as

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), this is

an unusual case.

If West Jordan had answered the inter-

rogatories and not falsely alleged that the information was
readily available from its business records, plaintiffs would
not have incurred the expenses of an accountant-

Therefore,

the lower court should have awarded the auditing expenses as
a cost.

see American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer,

558

1211

P.2d

(Ore.

1976);

Andrecikopoulos

v.

Broadmoor

Management, 670 P.2d 435 (Colo- App- 1983).
Further, if West Jordan had not violated Rule 11 as
set forth in Part VII C of this Brief, plaintiffs would not
have incurred the expense of an accountant.

The lower court

could and would have ruled that the ordinance was void and
awarded Call and Jenkins a refundFor these reasons, the lower court erred in failing
to award plaintiff as costs, (1) the master's fee paid by the
plaintiffs; and

(2) the plaintiffs costs

accountant'js attempted audit.
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incurred by its

CONCLUSION
West

Jordan

deprived

Call

procedural rights of due process,

and

Jenkins

of

their

A § 1983 civil rights

judgment should be entered in favor of Call and Jenkins.
Because

West

Jordan

violated

Rule

11, Call and

Jenkins should be awarded a judgment for attorney fees.

In

the alternativef the case should be remanded for the lower
court to determine attorney

fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C- §

1988.
The master's and accountant's costs incurred in an
examination of West Jordan's records should be taxed to West
Jordan.
DATED t h i s

/hh

day of
of

Sfl//\
/wf

I/

,

1988

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys /fcsr Plainttiff
s'~\
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f
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ADDENDUM

CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAjk
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John CALL and Clark Jenkins,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 15908.
Supreme Court of Utah,
Dec 26, 1979.
Subdividers brought action to challenge
validity of ordinance adopted by city which
required subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land to city or to pay
equivalent of that value in cash to be used
for flood control and/or park and recreation
facilities. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., upheld
validity of ordinance and denied subdivide d requests for injunctive relief and damages, and subdividers-appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., upheld validity
of ordinance.
Affirmed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred and filed opinion.
Wilkins, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which Maughan, J., concurred.
1. Zoning and Planning <fc=»86
City had authority to enact ordinance
which required subdividers to dedicate 7%
of proposed subdivision land, or pay equivalent of that value in cash, to be used for
flood control and/or park and recreation
facilities. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one
Judge concurring and one Judge specially
concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 10-8-84, 10-9-1,
10-9-3, 10-9-19 et seq., 1O-9-20, 10-9-22,
10-9-25.
2. Zoning and Planning <s=>86
Fact that dedication of 7% of proposed
subdivision land area or its cash value redounded to benefit of subdivision as well as
to general welfare of whole community did
not invalidate ordinance which provided for
such land dedication. (Per Crockett. C. J..

with one Justice concurring and one Justice
specially concurring.)
3. Trusts *»30%<1)
If money is collected from public for
specific purpose, it becomes a trust fund
committed to carrying out that purpose.
(Per Crockett, C. J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice specially concurring.)
4. Eminent Domain <*=>2(L2)
City, which received $16,576 from subdividers under ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land area or to pay equivalent of that
value in cash to be used for flood control
and/or park and recreation facilities, was
not taking land under power of eminent
domain without following requirement of
paying just compensation but was merely
imposing reasonable regulations on subdividers as prerequisite for permitting creation of subdivision. (Per Crockett, C. J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice
specially concurring.)
5. Zoning and Planning <*»602
Question of percentage of land in subdivision to be committed to public purpose
is within prerogative of city council to determine, and so long as it is within reasonable limits, so that it cannot be characterized
as capricious or arbitrary, courts will not
interfere therewith. (Per Crockett, C. J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice
specially concurring.)
6. Zoning and Planning <*=>86
Ordinance which required subdividers
to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land
or to pay equivalent of that value in cash to
be used for flood control and/or park and
recreation facilities was within scope of
powers granted to city so that it could plan
for general good of community as well as
for newly created subdivision. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one Justice concurring and
one Justice specially concurring.)
7. Zoning and Planning <*» 382.4
Payment to city of cash equivalent of
7% of subdivision land area, which was
made Dursuant to ordinance for general
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purpose of parks, recreation facilities and
flood control, was not necessarily to be used
solely for subdivided subdivision or any
other particular one; it did not prevent city
from imposing reasonable condition of construction of storm sewers and did not prevent city from refusing to credit subdivide s with cost of storm sewers against cash
they paid. (Per Crockett, C. J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice specially
concurring.)
Robert J. DeBry and Valden P. Livingston, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for
respondent
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs John Call and Clark Jenkins,
subdividers, brought this action in which
they challenge the validity of an ordinance
adopted by the defendant City which requires that subdividers dedicate 7 percent
of the land to the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in cash, to be used for
flood control and/or parks and recreation
facilities. The district court upheld the validity of the ordinance and denied plaintiffs'
request for injunctive relief and damages.
The latter appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is
invalid because: (1) it is not within the
City's granted powers; (2) the land or the
money required is not for the benefit of the
subdivision, but rather the City as a whole;
(3) that the City is attempting to exercise
the power of eminent domain without following the requirements thereof and paying
just compensation; and (4) it unlawfully
imposes a tax.
On January 21, 1975, the City amended
an existing ordinance (No. 33) relating to
subdivisions by adding the following:
Section 9-C-8(a). In addition to all the
other requirements prescribed under this
ordinance the subdivider shall be required
to dedicate seven percent (7.0%) of the
land area of the proposed subdivision to
the public use for the benefit and use of
1. Johnson v. Sandv Citv Com

the citizens of the City of West Jordan
or in the alternative at the option of the governing body of the City,
the City may accept the equivalent value
of the land in cash if it deems advisable.
Sections 9-C-8(b) and (d) further provide
that the money received "shall be used by
the City for its flood control and/or parks
and recreational facilities" and that if the
City elects to receive money in lieu of land,
payment shall be made "by the subdivider
on or before final approval of the plat is
given by the City Council."
On May 2, 1977, the plaintiffs presented
to the City two plats and maps for a proposed "Wescall subdivision" which, if approved, would result in the future development of 92 lots on about 30 acres of land
located in the City. When the City exercised its option to accept money in lieu of
land, plaintiff Clark Jenkins paid, under
protest, $16,576.00, representing about 7
percent of the value of his land. The City
Council then approved the subdivision and
the plats were recorded. The City refused
plaintiffs' demand to refund the money and
this action resulted.
In rejecting plaintiffs' attack upon the
ordinance, the trial court stated in its memorandum decision:
As it affects the plaintiffs, it is the
opinion of this Court that the City of
West Jordan, Utah's ordinance 33, as
amended January 21, 1975, is valid and
constitutional. It is further the Court's
opinion that there has been no taking of
the plaintiffs property by the defendant
without just compensation nor has the
defendant levied an invalid tax upon the
plaintiffs. See Sees. 10-9-1 through 109-30, U.C.A. 1953. [Citing cases.]
The Authority of the City
[1] It is not questioned that cities have
no inherent sovereign power, but only those
granted by the legislature.1 But it must be
realized that it is impractical for statutes to
spell out to the last detail all of the things
city governments must do to perform the
28 Utah 2d 22 4<V7 P 2H \(UA nQT>\
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functions imposed upon them by law. This
prepare regulations governing the subdiCourt has in numerous cases recognized this
vision of land within the municipality. A
and has held that cities have those powers
public hearing thereon shall be held by
which are expressly granted and also those
the legislative body, after which the legisnecessarily implied to carry out such relative body may adopt said regulations
sponsibilities.2
for the municipality.
[all emphasis herein added.]
There are a series of statutes through
which the City derives its authority to enact If the above statutes are viewed together,
ordinances of the character here in ques- and in accordance with their intent and
tion. Sec. 10-&-84, U.C.A. 1953, grants to purpose, as they should be, it seems plain
cities the authority and the duty
enough that the ordinance in question is
. . to preserve the health, safety within the scope of authority and responsiand good order of the city and its inhabit- bility of the city government in the promoants.
tion of the "health, safety, morals and genThis idea is carried forward and echoed in eral welfare" of the community.5
Section 10-9-1, U . C J L 1953, which provides
Just how essential and desirable it is that
that:
cities have such authority in planning their
For the purpose of promoting health, growth is brought into sharp focus by resafety, morals and the general welfare of flecting, on the one hand, upon the condithe community the legislative body of tions in the slum and ghetto areas of varicities and towns is empowered to regulate ous cities, where there are none, or inadeand restrict
the location and quate, parks and playgrounds and, on the
use of buildings, structures and land for other, upon the enrichment of life which
trade, industry, residence or other pur- has been conferred on other cities where
poses.
there are parks, plazas, recreational and
Further dealing with that subject and more cultural areas (some of which are very faspecific as to the establishment of parks, mous) for the use of the public
Section lJt-9-3 states that such regulations
In modern times of ever-increasing popu. . . shall be made in accordance lation and congestion, real estate developers
with a comprehensive plan designed to buy land at high prices. From the comfacilitate adequate provision for bined pressures of competition and desire
transportation, water, sewage, schools, for gain, they often squeeze every lot they
paries and other public requirements.
can into some labyrinthian plan, with only
The Municipal Planning Enabling Act 3 the barest minimum for tortious and circuiempowers a city to have a planning com- tous streets, without any arterial ways
mission which may "adopt and certify to through such subdivisions, and with little or
the legislative body, a master plan for the no provision for parks, recreation areas, or
physical development of the municipality." 4 even for reasonable "elbow room." The
Section 10-9-22 states that the planning need for some general planning and control
commission "shall have such powers as may is apparent, and makes manifest the wisbe necessary to enable it to perform its dom underlying the delegation of powers to
functions and promote municipal planning." the cities, as is done in the statutes above
Significantly/ Section 10-9-25 then pro- referred to.
vides:
As undeveloped land is improved, it is
In exercising the powers granted to it also important that some provision for flood
by the act, the planning commission shallcontrol be made. To the extent that the
2. See Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504,
124 P.2d 537 (1942); and Butt v. Salt Lake City
Corp., Utah, 550 P.2d 202 (1976).
3. 10-9-19 et seq.f U.C.A. 1953.

4. 10-9-20, U.C.^. 1953.
5. Language from Sec. 10-9-1, U.C.A. 1953.
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establishment of subdivisions increases the
need for flood control measures or recreational facilities, it is both fair and essential
that subdividers be required to contribute
to the costs of providing those facilities.
Lack of Benefit to the Subdivision
[2] In their point No. (2), the plaintiffs
attack the ordinance on the ground that the
land dedicated (or the money in lieu thereof) is not to be used solely and exclusively
for the benefit of the created subdivision.
They point to the provision that the land is
received "for the benefit and use of the
citizens of the City of West Jordan" and the
money is used for "its [West Jordan's] flood
control and/or parks and recreation facilities."
We agree that the dedication should have
some reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the subdivision.1 But in the
planning for the expansion of a city, it is
obvious that no particular percentage of
each subdivision, or of each lot, could be
used as a park or playground in that particular subdivision; and likewise, that it could
not be so used for flood control. But it is so
plain as to hardly require expression that if
the purpose of the ordinance is properly
carried out, it will redound to the benefit of
the subdivision as well as to the general
welfare of the whole community. The fact
that it does so, rather than solely benefiting
the individual subdivision, does not impair
the validity of the ordinance.7
[3] These observations are also pertinent: Although the money which was collected from the plaintiffs in this case was
6. See statements in Aunt Hack Ridge Estates,
Inc. v. Planning Commission of Danbury, 27
ConiLSup. 74, 230 A^d 45 (1967); Krughoff v.
City of Napervillc, 68 IlUd 352. 12 HLDec. 185,
369 N.EL2d 892 (1977); Home Builders Ass'n v.
City of Kansas City, Mo., 555 S.W.2d 832
(1977).
7. Ayres v. City Council 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d
1 (1949); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 484 P 2d 606 (1971).
8. 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Sec.
39.45 states that: "Special funds are often created
for a particular purpose, and in
such case the general rule is that they cannot

deposited in the City's general fund, it
should not be assumed that the money thus
becomes usable for other purposes by the
City and is of no special benefit to the area
sought to be subdivided. On the contrary,
that it will be used for its stated purpose is
assured, first, by the integrity and good
faith of the public officials charged with
that responsibility; and second, by the fact
that the recognized principle is that if money is collected from the public for a specific
purpose, it becomes a trust fund committed
to the carrying out of that purpose.8
The Eminent Domain Issue
[4] There is an obvious fallacy in the
plaintiffs' argument that the City has not
followed the proper procedure for taking
plaintiffs' property under eminent domain.
This is not a proceeding initiated by the
City to acquire property.* It has indicated
no desire to compel the plaintiff to subdivide their property, nor to dedicate any part
of i t The plaintiffs are the moving parties,
and as a prerequisite for permitting the
creation of the subdivision, the City, under
the powers conferred upon it as hereinabove discussed, can and does impose reasonable regulations.1*
Invalidity as a Tax
Plaintiffs urge that the requirements of
the ordinance in question are but a revenueraising scheme for the purpose of meeting
the financial needs of the City, and thus
constitute an improper levy of a tax upon
their property, this labeling is but an exbe used for any other purpose" and that
'*. .
a fund raised by a municipality for a
special purpose is a trust fund, and equity will,
in a proper case, interfere to prevent its diversion." (Citing cases.)
9. See Ayres v. City Council, supra, note 7;
Petterson v. City of Napennlle, 9 I11.2d 233, 137
N.E.2d 371 (1956).
10. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182, 187 (1964);
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 77 N.M. 86,
419 P2d 460 (1966); Mid-Contment Builders,
Inc. v Midwest City. Okl.. 539 P2d 1377
(1975).

CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORpAN

Utah

221

Cite as, Utah, €80«P.2d217

ercise in semantics which misconstrues the
purpose of the ordinance to make another
attack upon it It has been adjudicated
that such an ordinance, if reasonably designed and carried out for the purpose intended, is a proper form of planning for the
good of the community, and is not such a
prohibited tax.11
[5] The question as to the percentage of
the land in the subdivision (in this instance,
7 percent) to be committed to the public
purpose is within the prerogative of the
City Council to determine, and so long as it
is within reasonable limits, so that it cannot
be characterized as capricious or arbitrary,
the courts will not interfere therewith.12
[6] In harmony with what has been said
above, it is our opinion that the ordinance
under attack is within the scope of the
powers granted to the City so that it can
plan for the general good of the community
as well as for the newly-created subdivisions.
We have decided the principal issue which
was addressed by the parties in the district
court, and on this appeal, as to the validity
of the ordinance. However, we observe
that in the averments of the affidavits,
there are other matters which may need to
be resolved on remand; and accordingly, it
is deemed appropriate that we make some
additional comments.13
There is no question, but that the ordinance should be applied fairly, and without
favoritism or discrimination insofar as that
can be accomplished. In view of the averment in plaintiffs' affidavit that that principle has been violated, the trial court
should be concerned with examination into
and resolution of any legitimate issue raised
thereon.
[7] In his affidavit, plaintiff Clark Jenkins averred that he not only paid the $16,576 (assumed to be 7 percent of the value of
11. Petterson v. City of Naperville, supra, note
9; Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78,
271 N.Y.S^d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
12. For an excellent discussion of the vanous
constitutional challenges that have been made
regarding subdivision legislation, see Associat-

the subdivision, $248,000) but was also required to dedicate .028 acres valued at
$1,500; and to expend about $19,000 in construction of a storm sewor (which plaintiff
urges is flood control) before the City would
approve the subdivision. He asserts that
these amounts are in excess of the 7 percent
required by the ordinance The City's affidavit states that it received the $16,576, but
says nothing about receiving the other
amounts just referred to. It is, of course,
essential that the amount the City exacts
pursuant to the ordinance is not more than
the 7 percent of value of plaintiffs' property it prescribes.
Our final observation is on plaintiffs' urgence that the $19,000 they expended in
constructing a storm sewer should be credited upon their obligation under the ordinance. From what has been said in this
decision, it should be sufficiently plain that
the 7 percent exacted pursuant to the ordinance is for the general purpose of parks,
recreation facilities and flood control, and is
to be so administered and expended by the
city government for that purpose; and that
it is not necessarily to be used solely for the
plaintiffs' subdivision or any other particular one. This does not in any way prevent
the City from imposing other reasonable
conditions upon the approval of a subdivision and proposed construction therein, including requiring a storm sewer if the conditions are such that it is needed in that
subdivision for the protection of future residents thereof or other residents of the City.
We therefore do not disagree with the
City's requirement of the storm sewer, nor
with its refusal to credit the plaintiff with
the cost thereof on its 7 percent required by
the ordinance.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed
and the case is remanded for further proed Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,
supra, note 7, and authorities therein cited.
13. See Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P ; LeGrand Johnson
Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P 2d 615
(1966).

222

Utah

606 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ceedings consistent with this opinion. No
costs awarded.
HALL, J., concurs.
STEWART, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the conclusion that § 9-C-8(a)
of the ordinance of the City of West Jordan
is authorized by § 10-8-84 U.C.A. (1953), as
amended. This statute delegates to cities
general police power to be used for the
benefit of the city and its inhabitants.
However, the ordinance in question clearly
approaches
constitutionally
protected
rights, h e., tne prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. The power of a city, or for that
matter of the state, to require subdividers
to dedicate a portion of their land for public
improvements is not without limitation. In
my judgment, the Court should address the
problem of what standards delineate a constitutional and an unconstitutional forced
dedication by a subdivider. The question is
certainly one that will recur and ought to
be resolved by the Court

Lake City? Lark v. Whitehead? American
Fork City v. Robinson?9 Layton City v
Speth?1 and other cases.
I shall relate my view of this case, as well
as review what I perceive to be the correct
legal principles applicable to it. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
Subdividers have undertaken to develop a
subdivision within the City's boundaries and
have dedicated land area and installed
storm sewer facilities within the subdivision
and have additionally paid $16,576 to the
City, all in response to City demands made
under authority of the Ordinance as a prerequisite to subdivision approval. The record and briefs indicate a dispute as to
whether the land was dedicated and the
money paid under protest. No formal written protest appears in the record, but plaintiffs claim they attended a city council
meeting in which they orally objected to the
land dedication and fee payment

The majority opinion forms a perilous
new rule today by impermissibly expanding
municipal powers, for the first time in this
State, beyond those granted cities and
towns by our Legislature and beyond those
recognized by subdivision, zoning, and municipal government authorities, and it endangers the sound precedent of narrowly
construing municipal powers which has been
developed in Salt Lake City v. Revene?
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake,2 Salt Lake City
v. Sutter? Tooele City v. Elkington? Nance
v. Mayflower Tavern? Parker v. Provo
City? Nasfell v. Ogden City? Bohn v. Salt

Subdividers framed their complaint as a
class action seeking a declaration of the
invalidity of the Ordinance on their own
behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated. Other than a general denial in its
answer and the allegation that the class
consisted of 28 subdividers rather than the
100 alleged by plaintiffs buried within an
affidavit on another subject, the City has
totally failed to address, either here or below, the Subdividers1 class action allegations. The record does not indicate whether
the District Court made any of the determinations contemplated by Rule 23(a) or (b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but the
Court disposed of the matter in an Order
dated April 21,1978, denying the Subdividers' "Motion for Declaration of a Class Ac-

1. 101 Utah 504, 124 P2d 537 (1942).

7. 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952).

2. 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955).

8. 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2tf 591, 81 A.L.R. 215 (1932).

3. 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923).

9. 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 P.2d 557 (1972).

WILKINS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent

4. 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941).

10. 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930).

5. 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).
11. Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978).
6. Utah. 543 P.2d 769 (1975).
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tion." The City's motion to dismiss was
treated as one for summary judgment. On
May 17, 1978, the District Court ruled in
favor of the City's motion, and against the
Subdividers' motion, that the Ordinance
was valid and the City's demands were in
conformity with it.
Except for cities which operate under
charter12 and derive their authority from
Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, the cities of this State are "creatures
of statute and limited in powers to those
delegated by the legislature,
" 13
All power and authority of our nonchartered municipalities is derived through legislative grant, and for the Ordinance under
review here to be upheld, it must have been
enacted pursuant to an enabling statute.
Prior to the majority decision here, this
Court recognized that legislative authority
may be exercised by municipalities in only
one of three ways. Justice Wolfe wrote in
Salt Lake City v. Revene:
It has been repeatedly stated by this
court "that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation,—not simply convenient, but
indispensable." 1 Dillon Municipal Corporation, 5th Ed., p. 448, § 237; . . . M
[Emphasis added.]
and held therein that in the absence of a
specific legislative grant of power the city
had no authority to limit barbershop business hours for health purposes under three
statutory grants of power to cities and
towns. One statute provided cities power
to "license, tax, and regulate" barbershops.
A second statute empowered cities to
promulgate regulations "to secure the gen12. The City in this case does not represent
itself to be chartered.
13. Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, supra, note 2 at
3 Utah 2d 387, 284 P.2d 703.

eral health of the city/' and the third broadly delegated to cities authority to enact
ordinances for the public health, safety,
prosperity, morals, peace and good order,
and comfort and convenience of the city
and its inhabitants. That third statute now
appears in our Code as § 10-8-84 and is
relied upon by the City and the majority
opinion as authority for the City to enact
the Ordinance under attack here.
In Salt Lake City v. Sutter,1* defendant's
conviction for violating Salt Lake City's
prohibition ordinance was reversed, this
Court holding that the statute enabling
cities to pass ordinances necessary to provide for the safety, health, morals, comfort
and convenience, again the statute relied
upon by the City and the majority opinion,
did not authorize the City's legislation prohibiting possession of intoxicating liquors.
Whatever power or authority municipalities in this state have is derived from
the Legislature.
It will hardly be contended that the
ordinance in question is "essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation." As we
have seen, it is not included within any
express grant; nor is it necessarily or
fairly implied as an incident to the powers expressly granted measured by the
rule laid down by the authorities.
It may be, and is, contended that the
ordinance in question is only carrying out
the general policy of the state as reflected by the legislative enactment making it an offense against the state law for
any person to knowingly have in his possession without authority intoxicating liquors within the state. But the policy of
the state cannot control in determining
the powers of a municipality. Those
powers must be measured and determined by the grants found in the charter
or in the general laws purporting to enumerate such powers.
14. Supra, note 1. Although cited by the majority as authority for its position here, Revene
held, m direct conflict with the majority, that
the Ordinance enacted by the City exceeded the
City's authority under the enabling statutes.
15. Supra, note 3.

We can see no escape from the conclusion that the board of city commissioners
of Salt Lake City was without authority
to enact the ordinance in question on this
appeal.1*
The requirement that cities must have
express authority to enact ordinances is not
unique to Utah. McQuillin in Municipal
Corporations, and Yokley, in The Law of
Subdivisions, state as a general proposition
that dedication ordinances require enabling
legislation.
In some jurisdictions, zoning-enabling
statutes authorize local zoning bodies to
require, as a condition precedent to development, that subdividers dedicate portions of their property for public purposes, or pay an assessment in lieu of
dedication. There must be express statutory authority granting the power to municipalities to impose such conditions, or
at least language from which the intention to grant the power may be inferred,
n
Further, judicial scrutiny of a municipal
ordinance differs from that imposed in the
test of a State statute in that the usual
presumption of validity of the sovereign's
action does not apply. In the case of an
ordinance, any reasonable doubt must be
resolved against the municipality's power to
enact it, and any questioned power must be
denied18
Neither party nor the majority opinion
cites any Utah statute directly authorizing
16. Id. at 61 Utah 540, 41, 216 P. 237. Also
supporting this rule is Tooele City v. Elkington,
supra, note 4.
17. 8 McQuillin, Mun.Corp. § 25.146a (Rev.
1976). 1 Yokley Mun. Corp. § 97 (Supp.1978,
p. 179); Accord, Yokley, The Law of Subdivisions § 15 (1963).
18. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, supra, note 5;
Parker v. Provo City, supra, note 6; Nasfell v.
Ogden City, supra, note 7; Sait Lake City v.
Revene, supra, note 1.
19. Maps and plats to be acknowledged, certified, approved, and recorded. Such map or
plat shall be acknowledged by such owner before some officer authorized by law to take the
acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate.

the City's enactment of the Ordinance \i
this case. The City refers us only tc
§ 57-5-3 l 9 and to Title 10, Chapter 9 of the
Utah Code Ann. The majority opinior
finds authority for the City's action ir
§ 10-8-84 and various sections in Title 10
Chapter 9, under the theory that the Cit}
was acting under those powers necessaril}
implied to it to carry out those powen
expressly granted. Section 57-5-3 govern*
the nature of maps and plats a subdivide]
must file and have approved. Title 10
Chapter 9, is a Legislative grant of powei
to cities and towns for the purpose of enacting zoning regulations to promote the
"health, safety, morals and general welfare
of the community." Chapter 10 also ineludes the Municipal Planning Enabling
Act, §§ 10-9-19 through 10-9-30, whici
empowers any city to adopt a master plar
for the physical development of the municipality and to promulgate regulations to assure that subdivisions conform to the master plan. The City has adopted a mastei
plan as contemplated by the Act.
Section 10-8-84 is a broad grant of the
State's police "powers to cities and town*
and is frequently referred to as the "gener
al welfare clause."21 It is derived froir
Utah's earliest laws and states:
They [the cities and towns] may pas*
all ordinances and rules, and make al
regulations, not repugnant to law, neces
sary for carrying into effect or discharg
ing all powers and duties conferred b}
this chapter, and such as are necessary
and certified by the surveyor making such plat
if the land is situated in any city or mcorporat
ed town such plat or map shall be approved by
its governing body, or by some city or towi
officer for that purpose designated by resoiu
tion or ordinance of such governing body;
See also § 57-5-4, which states:
Such maps and plats, when made, acknowl
edged, filed and recorded, shall operate as z
dedication of all such streets, alleys and othei
public places, and shall vest the fee of suet
parcels of land as are therein expressed, namee
or intended for public uses in such county, citj
or town for the public for the uses thereir
named or intended.
20. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, supra, note 8; Lari
v. Whitehead, supra, note 9.
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and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve the health, and promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein;
Emphasis added.]
This section is not, however, authority for
the Ordinance under attack here. Cases
decided under this statute are emphatic and
explicit in limiting its scope. In Nasfell v.
Ogden City,n the city's power to enact an
ordinance declaring that the presence of a
vehicle parked in violation upon any public
street was prima facie evidence that the
registered owner committed the violation,
was successfully challenged.
Although
Chief Justice Crockett reasoned there as
here, that what is now Section 10-8-84
implied to the city the power to enact the
ordinance, the Court held that the city had
been granted no express authority to pass
the ordinance, and that the city had no
implied power to pass the ordinance based
upon this general welfare statute or statutes granting cities the right to regulate
the use of streets, traffic and sidewalks.
The Court has also characterized this
statute as "merely in aid of the express
powers elsewhere granted"22 in invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting keeping a
pool table or playing pool. And in Lark v.
Whitehead;a Chief Justice Crockett again
dissenting, the Court held that while the
cities had been expressly granted Legislative authority to enact an ordinance punishing persons for indecent or disorderly conduct in § 10-8-50, Salt Lake City's ordinance exceeded that statutory grant, and
that even under § 10-8-84, the statute relied upon in the majority opinion here, the
city had no implied power to enact its ordinance.
,
The general provisions of Sec. 10-8-84
do not confer authority upon a municipal
21. Supra, note 7.
22. American Fork City v. Robinson, et al.t supra, note 10 at 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 250. Accord, Bonn v. Salt Lake City, supra note 8.
23. Supra, note 9.

body to abrogate the limitations specified
in the express provisions of Sec 10-8-50,
U.C.A.1953. In Salt Lake City v. Sutter
this court cited the principle that where
an express authority is given to pass ordinances in a particular class of cases, followed by a general authority to pass all
necessary laws, the express authority is a
limitation upon the general power so far
as it relates to matters which belong to
the class of those enumerated, but which
are not, in terms, included. A general
power granted to the corporation to pass
all ordinances necessary for the welfare
of the corporation, is qualified and restricted by those other clauses and provisions of the charter or the general law
which specify particular purposes for
which ordinances may be passed. Otherwise, the general clause would confer authority to abrogate the limitations implied from the express provisions.24
In Layton City v. Speth,35 this Court set
aside a conviction under a city ordinance
which exceeded the statutory grant of authority from the Legislature. In Layton
City, the city had enacted an ordinance
making it illegal for a vehicle owner to
knowingly and intentionally permit persons
who possess, use, or distribute controlled
substances to occupy his vehicle. The State

statute in effect at the time the ordinance
was enacted granted to cities the power to
prohibit distribution of intoxicating liquors,
narcotics or controlled substances to persons
under the age of twenty-one. This Court
held over the dissents of Chief Justice
Crockett and Justice Hall, that the ordinance was not necessary for carrying into
effect the purposes of the statute, was beyond the scope of Legislative authority
granted to the city, and was therefore invalid.
The remaining statutes cited by the City
and the majority opinion as implied authori24. Id. at 28 Utah 2d 346, 502 P.2d 559. Accord,
Allgood v. Larson, Utah, 545 P.2d 530 (1976).
25. Supra, note 11 J
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ty for the City to enact the Ordinance are
zoning statutes found in Title 10, Chapter &,
and §§ 57-5-3 and 57-5-4, the pertinent
parts of which are cited in footnote 19 of
this opinion. Clearly, these statutes do not
grant the City express authority to enact
the Ordinance nor do I find in these statutes implied authority to enact the Ordinance to carry out powers expressly granted under the zoning statutes. A generalized difference between zoning statutes and
subdivision controls is that zoning normally
prohibits certain uses of property, while the
title remains in the private owner, and subdivision controls normally make positive exactions, such as conveyance of the title to
the city, from the private owner.
. . (7]t must be kept in mind
that zoning regulations, generally, only
limit the use of the property, whereas
subdivision legislation often exacts a penalty for approval of a desired use.2*
Traditionally, zoning and subdivision
have been founded on separate legislation
and administered separately. Subdivision
regulation and zoning are frequently interrelated in purpose and technique; .
[Nonetheless, fundamental differences
do exist between the two areas. While
zoning involves no more than negative
prohibitions on certain uses of the owner's property, subdivision regulation often
makes positive exactions of the owner.
It may require him to construct streets or
sewers, to convey a portion of his land to
the municipality for public use, or to pay
the equivalent of such construction or
dedication in cash. It is submitted that
this difference necessitates a more specific test of constitutionality, i. e., the legislation should not only be substantially
related to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, but, insofar. as
dedications, activities and expenditures
are positively required of the subdivides
these requirements should be reasonably
26. Noland v. SL Louis County, Mo., 478 S.W.2d
363, 366 (1972).
27. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 Syracuse L.Rev. 417. 407 (Spring
1963).

related to the subdivision in question and
should concern types of improvement for
which municipalities have generally been
conceded the power to levy special taxes
or assessments.27 [Emphasis added.]
Here, the City is not attempting to rezone
the Subdividers' property from residential
use to municipal use for schools and parks
or to otherwise limit or prohibit its use. In
this case, the City is requiring the Subdividers to convey land to it, or to pay it an
amount of money equal to the value of the
land, without remuneration. In no sense is
this a conventional zoning case.
Further, §§ 57-5-3 and 57-5-4 cannot
stand as authority for the Ordinance. The
statutes automatically vest fee title in the
municipal agency upon acknowledgment
and recordation of the plat. They do not
delegate to the cities and towns the power
to enact ordinances exacting property or in
lieu fees, without compensation, from private property owners as a condition to subdivision approval. Nor can such exaction
be read as necessarily or even fairly implied
from those sections.
In his review of State statutory authorizations for subdivision control, Yokley reviews §§ 57-5-1 to 57-5-8 of our Code and
states:
A review of these provisions indicates
an absence of any standards governing
approval of plats except the usual directions for delineation of lots and
streets, that is, there seems to be no
authority conferred for the promulgation
of regulations by the governing body
which would require the meeting of certain conditions as a prerequisite to plat
approval. The statute itself contains no
provisions for meeting conditions before
plat approval.28
Anderson, in The American Law of Zoning, distinguishes between requiring a subdivision developer to plan for streets and
28. Yokley, The Law of Subdivisions, § 116
(1963). (Although this text is updated with a
1979 pocket part, Yokley had noted no new
developments or changes to his stated position
on Utah law in the 1963 text.)
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sewers, which he states can be required
with or without subdivision controls, and
which may be required in this State under
§§ 57-5-3 and 57-5—4, and exacting proper*
ty for other municipal purposes, which he
repeatedly states must be done pursuant to
strictly construed enabling legislation.29
Finally, the Municipal Planning Enabling
Act,* and specifically § 10-9-25, quoted by
the majority opinion, cannot stand as sufficient authority for the City to take the
Subdivided property under its Ordinance.
That Section states: "In exercising the
powers granted to it by the act [the Municipal Planning Enabling Act], the planning
commission shall prepare regulations governing the subdivision of land within the
municipality/' [Emphasis added.] Nowhere does the act authorize the planning
commission or any municipality of this
State to take any portion of a subdivided
property. The act enables municipal bodies
to adopt a master plan (which the City has
adopted), establish an official street map
and to zone in conformance with those
plans. It gives cities and towns the power
to prohibit the issuance of a building permit
or approval of a subdivision which does not
conform to the master plan, and it makes it
a misdemeanor to sell subdivision lots without planning commission approval. Again,
in this case, the City is not attempting
either to rezone the Subdividers' property
or to refuse to approve their subdivision
until it conforms to the master plan; the
City, here, is appropriating the Subdividers'
property.
The Legislature has had two opportunities to expressly expand the powers available to municipalities in controlling problems
associated with rapid subdivision development, but it has not, as yet, prescribed that
necessary expended power. In 1973, a bill
was introduced'in the Utah Senate which
would have delegated to the cities the power to require fees or dedication of land or
both as a condition for approval of a subdivision plat. In 1975, a bill amending
29. 4 Anderson, The American Law of Zoning,
§ 23.39, p. 141 (1977); see generally §§ 23.05,
23.08, 23.26. and 23.39.

§ 10-9-25 was introduced in the Utah Senate which would have allowed cities and
counties to prescribe qualifications upon
subdividers, such as providing for storm
drainage systems, parks and recreational
facilities in order to gain approval of their
subdivision plats. Neither bill gained the
approval of both Houses of the Legislature.
I have reviewed those statutes characterized by the City and the majority opinion as
enabling the City's actions here, and I remain unpersuaded that any or all of them
are sufficient to expressly grant or necessarily imply to the City that power which it
seeks to exercise by Ordinance No. 33. As
noted ante, the normal presumptions in favor of th$ validity of statutes do not generally apply to ordinances, and this especially
when the questioned ordinance seeks to appropriate to the government some protected
private right.
There is some difference of view with
respect to a presumption of power to
enact an ordinance and also with respect
to burden of proof on that issue. Generally, there is no such presumption of validity of an ordinance as against the objection that no pqwer existed under charter or statute to ^nact it. In other words,
there is no presumption in favor of the
validity of an ordinance where it is questioned on the ground of want of power to
enact it; on the contrary, power to pass it
must appear to have existed when it was
adopted, if the ordinance is to be sustained. Accordingly, one claiming under
an ordinance must be able to point to
existing power to enact it, either granted
in express terms or in terms by which the
power is fairly and necessarily implied.
Also, proof of authority to enact an ordinance has been ruled to be necessary
where
objection is made to it
on the ground that it interferes with
common rights. Indeed, the view has
been taken that with respect to the exercise of every power by a municipal corporation, any reasonable doubt that arises
as to the existence of the power is to be
30. Sections 10-9-19 to 30.
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resolved against the corporation, and the
power is to be denied. Consistently, a
strict construction against ordinances restricting personal liberty, property, immunity or privilege is followed in many
cases. .
Certainly, where it is
clear that an ordinance exceeds the legislative powers of a city, it will not be
presumed to be valid.31

dated Home Builders v. City of Walnut
Creek,2* a case relied upon by the City and
the majority opinion, a dedication ordinance
similar to the ordinance here survived attack. But Associated Home Builders does
not stand for the proposition espoused by
the majority opinion, because that case construed an ordinance which had been enacted
pursuant to an express State enabling statute and a newly adopted amendment to the
California Constitution. And in 1974, California passed statutes3* requiring public
agencies benefiting from the subdivision
dedication to remunerate the developer-dedicator for his property.

Only after ordinances are satisfactorily
determined to have been enacted pursuant
to Legislative grants of authority may they
carry the presumption of validity. In Marshall v. Salt Lake City,*2 Utah's zoning statutes were declared constitutional and the
City's ordinances, enacted pursuant to those
The Subdividers also challenge the Ordiexpress grants of authority, were upheld. . nance as an unreasonable exercise of the
At that point, the presumption of validity police power because the City has deposited
attaches to the ordinance under attack and
the in lieu fees into its general account,
it will not be declared invalid unless it is
presumably to be used for general City
arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable,
purposes, and because they claim, the City
or unless it clearly offends some provision
has not shown that the exaction from them
38
of the Constitution or a statute.
is reasonably related to the demands placed
It is also only after a subdivision ordi- on the City by their subdivisions, and that
nance has been determined valid that it is therefore the exaction benefits others at
to be tested as to its reasonableness in their subdivision's expense. The affidavit
application to the particular fact situation. of one of the Subdividers (made a part of
In Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale*4 cited in the record) states, and the City does not
the majority opinion, villages in the State dispute, that the Subdividers' in lieu fees
of New York had been delegated sufficient have been used to purchase land for a
grants of power to require exactions from water-detention basin to receive run-off
subdividers, so the question became one of from subdivisions other than the one develthe reasonableness of the application of the oped by the Subdividers herein.
ordinance to the facts of that case, unlike
A reading of the Ordinance discloses that
our problem here. Applying the presumption test to the facts of this case, the Ordi- the land shall be dedicated or the in lieu
nance should fail for want of authority to fees paid "to the public use for the benefit
and use of the citizens of the City of West
enact i t
Jordan" and "shall be used by the City for
Several states have enacted statutes auflood control and/or parks and recreational
thorizing mandatory dedication of land or
I
in lieu fees as a prerequisite to plat approv- facilities."
al. These enactments, however, have taken
place with a keen eye to protecting the
rights of private property owners. In Asso-

As support for their argument, the Subdividers cite Weber Basin Home Builders
Ass'n v. Roy City*1 In that case, the Court

31. 6 McQuillin, supra, note 17, § 22.31.

34. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 [s|.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d
673 (1966).

32. 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943).
33. Id.; see also Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North
Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559
(1967).

35. 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 CaLRptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606
(1971).
36. Cal.Govnt.Code § 6(^477-80 (West).
37. 26 Utah 2d 215. 487 P.2d 866 (1971).
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struck as ultra vires and discriminatory a
city ordinance raising building permit fees
from $12 to $112. The money was received
and paid into the city's general fund, as also
occurred in this case, not for the purpose of
meeting increased costs of regulating building construction, but for the purpose of
improving the city's water and sewer systems necessitated by the construction of
new homes and for other general purposes.
The Court observed that equal protection
and due process principles are violated by
an ordinance which undertakes to impose a
greater burden of general government cost
on one class of residents than upon others
without reasonable basis for classification
and held that an ordinance which imposed a
greater burden on those who built within
the city after the ordinance than before its
enactment was constitutionally unacceptable. Chief Justice Crockett, writing for the
Court, correctly stated:
The critical question here in whether
the ordinance in its practical operation
results in an unjust discrimination by imposing a greater burden of the cost of
city government on one class of persons
as compared to another, without any
proper basis for such differentiation and
classification. It is not to be doubted
that each new residence has its effect in
increasing the cost of city government;
nor that due to the steadily increasing
costs of everything, including those involved in rendering such services, the city
would have authority to raise the fees
charged for such services from time to
time. Nevertheless, in that connection,
the new residents are entitled to be treated equally and on the same basis as the
old residents.38 [Emphasis added.]
I am not unsympathetic to the needs of
the cities in our State faced with dramatic
expansion. I am constrained, however, to
review their ordinances with sensitivity to
both the constitutionally protected rights of
property owners and the limiting nature of
the statutory grants of power to those
cities. And that sensitivity compels a view
on my part that the Ordinance is invalid
38.

and void becausi of the specific reasons
noted in this opinion.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dipsenting opinion of WILKINS, J.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Albert Banard LAMM and Roy Lee
Lamm, Defendants and Appellant
No. 15888.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jak 16, 1980.

Defendants were convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., of theft by receiving, and they
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J.,
held that evidence was sufficient to establish each element of offense charged, which
was based upon alleged concealing or aiding
in concealment of stolen property.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Criminal Law «=» 1159.2(7, 9), 1159.4(2)
It is exclusive function of jury to weigh
evidence and to determine credibility of
witnesses, and it is not within prerogative
of Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for that of fact finder; Supreme
Court should only interfere when evidence
is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly have reached
verdict beyond reasonable doubt.

Id. at 26 Utah 2d 218, 487 P 2d 868.
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the public interest 5 To accomplish this the
Commission is empowered by the Legislature to employ necessary personnel, including "experts" and "attorneys". 6 By comparison, there is no statute which even establishes, much less defines, the nature or
duties of the Division. The Division's existence is noted in the statutes 7 but nowhere
is the Division granted the right to litigate
in its own name or otherwise, or, significantly, to appeal Orders of the Commission.
I believe that, absent express statutory
authority granted by the Legislature, the
Division of Public Utilities has no standing
to appeal Orders of the Public Service Commission. Indeed, the implication of Section
13-1-1.3 is that the Division on behalf of
the executive director of the Department of
Business Regulation, is charged to execute
"any rules, regulations or orders of the public service commission of Utah issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial or rule-making power". This Court should not allow the Division, and particularly in the absence of a
definitive grant of authority by the Legislature, to assume the tension-filled role toward the Commission of both investigatorenforcer and adversary.
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John CALL and Clark Jenkins,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 15908 (Rehearing).
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 27, 1980.

required subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land to city or to pay
equivalent of that value in cash to be used
for flood control and/or park and recreation
facilities. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., upheld
ordinance, and subdividers appealed. The
Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217, affirmed and
remanded. On rehearing, the Supreme
Court, Wilkins, J., held that ordinance was
not unconstitutional on its face, but could
not be applied without subdividers being
given the opportunity to present evidence
to show that dedication required of them
had no reasonable relationship to needs, if
any, for flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Municipal Corporations o=> 122(2)
Once it is determined that municipal
ordinance is within the scope of powers
granted by the legislature, the ordinance is
entitled to the presuhnption of constitutional validity accorded other legislation.
2. Zoning and Planning o»61, 134
Ordinance which required subdividers
to dedicate 7^ of proposed subdivision land,
or pay equivalent of that value in cash, to
be used for flood control and/or park mu\
recreation facilities was not unconstitutional on its face, but could not be applied
without subdividers being given the opportunity to present evidence to show that
dedication required of them had no reasonable relationship to needs, if any, for flood
control or parks and recreation facilities
created by their subdivision.

Subdividers brought action to challenge
validity of ordinance adopted by city which

3. Zoning and Planning c=>234
If subdivision generates need for flood
control or parks and recreation facilities
and municipality exacts fee in lieu of dedi-

5.

6. Section 54 1-6.

See, e. g.. United States Smelting, Refining
and Milling Co. v Utah Power & Light Co., 58
Utah 168, 197 P. 902 (1921); Utah Light &
Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101
Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941).

7. See footnote 2, sup^a.

ui** i n v i n t RaruKlftK, Zd ^hKlES
cation of land for .such purpose^ fees
collected must be used in such a way as
benefit demonstrably the subdivision
question, though the benefit need not
solely to the particular subdivision

so
to
in
be

Rolnsrt J. DeBry and Valden P Livingston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and aopc Hants.
Lynn W. Mitton, Sandy, for defendant
and respondent.
WILKINS, Justice:
This matter is again before us following
our granting of plaintiffs' petition for
rehearing. The original majority opinion
addressed primarily the issue of whether
there was statutory authority for the City
of West Jordan to pass an ordinance requiring a subdivider to dedicate land or pay a
fee in lieu of dedication as a prerequisite to
approval of the subdivision plat.1 This issue was decided by the majority in the
affirmative.2 On rehearing this Court limited the scope of review to the issue of
whether the ordinance in question is constitutional, and therefore we address only this
matter now.

granted by the legislature—and the prior
opinion of this Court indicated that the
ordinance in question was—the ordinance is
entitled to the presumption of constitutional validity accorded other legislation.3 In
Lhi* case, the District Court ruled that the
ordinance was constitutional and therefore
granted West Jordan's motion to dismiss.
[2, 3] While we agree that the ordinance
is not unconstitutional on its face,4 plaintiffs raise questions as to its constitutionality *is applied to them which make disposition of this issue as a matter of law inappropriate. We stated in our prior opinion in
this case that "the dedication should have
some reasonable relationship to the need
created by the subdivision."5 This same
requirement has been articulated in the decisions of other jurisdictions addressing this
issue. In Jordan v. Village of Mcnomonee
Fa//s,6 the Court held:
We conclude that a required dedication
of land for
park or recreational sites as a condition for approval of the
subdivision plat should be upheld as a
valid exercise of police power if the evidence reasonably establishes that the municipality will be required to provide
rnore land for
parks and playgrounds as a result of approval of the
subdivision.

f 11 Once it is determined that a municipal ordinance is within the scope of powers
1. The ordinance in question in pertinent part
r
^ads as follows
Section 9 C 8(a)
In addition to all the
)ther requirements pr^s< nbed under this ordinance the subdivider shall be required to
dedicate the seven per cent (1%) of the land
area of the proposed subdivision to the public
ust- for the benefit and use or the < itizens of
the Citv of West lordjn
or in the
alternative at the option of the governing
bodv of the Citv, th» Citv mav accept the
equi\alent valu<> of »rV land in fash it it
de^ms advisable
2.

f
J)1 \ Cit\ nt VVVsf Jordan, Utah hOf, P 2d
2i7/r*7 f )) In ( ill I the minor of (his opinion
hi« d a dissenting opinion in whi« h Justice
M iijL'han ron* urred and A huh concluded that
tl M y is no statut »r e thontv for the <»rdir, MI. f in question

?». ' resmeir-Ho//«idj\ Homeowners
' n hu \ Enuh f lorjl ( nmoan\

\SS<KUI tab 545

p2d 1150 M976), 1 R Anderson, American
Law of Zoning 2d 11977). * 3 23
4.

5.

While brevitv and succinctness in the drafting of legislation—as in judicial opinions—mav
be des-rable and certainlv is appreciated, the
ordinance in question w hen compared with
similar provisions from other jurisdictions evidences a paucity ot stated purpose and standards of application that borders on rendering
the ordinance unconstitutionally vague See, e
X the ordinances quoted in Jordan \ Village of
Mennmonee Falls 28 Wis 2d 608. 137 N W 2d
±A1 (1965). Associated Home Builders \ Cit\
of Vi i\nvt tireek. K a l 3d 633. 4S4 ? 26 606. 94
( al Rptr 630 (1971) Home Builder* Assocux
aon ot Greater Kansas ('itv v ( it\ nt Kansas
Cir\ 575 S W 2d 832 < Mo 1977)
W«. P2d at 220

6. 2^ Wis 2d 608 618 137 N W 2d 442 448
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Likewise in Home Builders Association of
Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas
City/ the Missouri Supreme Court held:
if the burden cast upon the
subdivider is reasonably attributable to
his activity, then the requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu thereof] is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to
a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation
under the police power. Insofar as the
establishment of a subdivision within a
city increases the recreational needs of
the city, then to that extent the cost of
meeting that increase indeed may reasonably be required of the subdivider. (Emphasis in original.)
In this case the rule adopted by this
Court in Call /, quoted ante, cannot be
applied without plaintiffs being given the
opportunity to present evidence to show
that the dedication required of them had no
reasonable relationship to the needs for
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision, if any.
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that
if the subdivision generates such needs and
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only fair that the fee so collected be used in such a way as to benefit
demonstrably the subdivision in question.
This is not to say that the benefit must be
solely to the particular subdivision, but only
that there be some demonstrable benefit to
it.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No costs awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, By and Through the DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v,
UTAH MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL and
William A. Callahan, Defendants
and Appellant
No. 16501.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 3, 1980.
State sought review of a decision of the
Merit System Council ordering the reemployment of an employee of th<* Department of Community Affairs. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Counu, G. Hal
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that the exclusion of the director of
the Department of Community Affairs
from a portion of the administrative hearing because she was a witness in the proceeding was reversible error and the attendance by a deputy director, who directed
another arm of the operation and lacked
full knowledge of the case, was not sufficient to provide the Department with appropriate representation.
Affirmed.
1. Officers and Public Employees c=>72(l)
Both parties to proceeding before Merit
System Council were entitled to have testimony taken under oath or affirmation.
2. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2)
Failure to place witnesses before Merit
System Council under oath was not reversibly erroneous where no objection was
raised until State sought review of Council
order in district court.
3. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2)
Omissions from record of proceeding
before Merit System Council were not re-

7.

555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977).
Utah Rep. 608 615 P.2d—16

John CALL and Clark Jenkins,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 19186.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 23, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1986.
Subdividers brought action to challenge validity of ordinance adopted by city
which required subdividers to dedicate 7%
of proposed subdivision land to city or to
pay equivalent of that value in cash to be
used for flood control and/or park and
recreation facilities. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder,
J., upheld ordinance and subdividers appealed. The Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217,
affirmed and remanded. On rehearing, the
Supreme Court, 614 P.2d 1257, upheld facial constitutionally of ordinance and remanded with instructions. On remand, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., entered judgment in favor
of city and subdividers appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held
that city planning and zoning commission
failed to comply with statutory requirements of public hearing prior to adoption of
impact fee ordinance where advance notice
to public was not provided, ordinance being
considered had not yet been drafted, and
public did not have opportunity to voice
their views.
Remanded with instructions.
Stewart, J., dissented.
1. Appeal and Error e=>1201(3)
District court did not abuse its discretion in allowing developers to amend complaint after remand, where issues in
amended complaint were not specifically
foreclosed by appellate court during prior
review.

2. Zoning and Planning <3=>134, 135
City planning and zoning commission
failed to comply with statutory requirements of public hearing prior to adoption of
impact fee ordinance where advance notice
of purpose of meeting was not provided to
public, ordinance in issue had not yet been
drafted, and public did not have opportunity to express their views; it was not sufficient that ordinance was adopted at regularly scheduled city council meeting. U.C.
A.1953, 10-9-1 to 10-9-30.
3. Parties <s=»9, 11
District court did not abuse its discretion in denying class action status to developers challenging impact fee ordinance,
where proposed class members were identifiable, where each claim would require individual consideration by court regardless of
class status, and where there was no possibility that inconsistent judgments would be
issued if individual claims were brought.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 23.

Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan City
Atty., West Jordan, for defendant and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiffs, John Call and Clark Jenkins,
appeal from the trial court's dismissal of
their complaint and the entry of judgment
in favor of defendant, City of West Jordan.
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan
to expand its flood control and public park
systems to meet the increasing needs of
the growing city. As part of its plan, West
Jordan decided to impose an impact fee as 4
a condition to granting plat approval to
subdivision developers. The fee was seven
percent of the land in the subdivision or, at
the option of the city, the equivalent value
in cash. West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33,
§ 9-0-8(2) (1975). Plaintiffs paid the fees
under protest and later brought this action
attacking the ordinance.
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We have issued two previous opinions in
this case. In our first opinion, Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979)
(Call / ) , we held that U.C.A., 1953,
§§ 10-9-1 to -30 empowered West Jordan
to exact an impact fee to provide for flood
control and parks as a condition to granting plat approval. On rehearing, in Call v.
City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257
(1980) (Call II), we upheld the facial constitutionality of the ordinance, but we remanded to give plaintiffs an "opportunity
to present evidence to show that the dedication required of them had no reasonable
relationship to the needs for flood control
or parks and recreation facilities created by
their subdivision, if any." Id. at 1259.
[1] On remand, the trial court allowed
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a claim that the ordinance was invalid
because West Jordan had not followed statutory requirements in enacting it Although West Jordan does not cross-appeal
the allowance of the amendment, it urges
this Court to limit the case to the constitutional "reasonableness" issue. However,
the pleadings may be amended after remand within the sound discretion of the
trial court so long as they do not cover
issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, 113 Utah 60,
191 P.2d 153 (1948), Utah R.Civ.P. 15; see
White v. Lobdell, 196 Mont 156, 638 P.2d
1057 (1982); Diversified Capitol Corp. v.
City of North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 15, 590
P.2d 146 (1979). The trial court allowed
West Jordan to argue why the pleadings
should not be amended; but after consideration, allowed the amendment. Neither
Call I nor Call II specifically addressed
this issue, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowing the amendment Therefore, the issue of whether
West Jordan had followed statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance was
properly before the trial court
Because of problems encountered by the
plaintiffs in its discovery of information in
the possession of West Jordan and because
of our decision in Banberry Development

Corp. v. South Jotdan City, 631 P.2d 899
(Utah 1981), the trii.1 court issued a pretrial
order which placed on West Jordan the
burden of producing evidence on several
issues. These issues may be condensed
into two main issues: (1) the reasonableness of the impact fee as applied to plaintiffs, and (2) whether the ordinance had
been adopted according to statutory requirements.
It is necessary in this opinion to treat
only the second issue. West Jordan was
required at the threshold to present prima
facie evidence that the city had followed
the statutory requirements contained in
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10*-9-l to -30 in enacting
the ordinance. Within section 25, the legislature has set forth specific procedures
that a municipality must follow to exercise
the powers granted to it
In exercising the powers granted to it by
the act, the planning commission shall
prepare regulations governing the subdivision of land within the municipality. A
public hearing thereon shall be held by
the legislative body, after which the legislative body may adopt said regulations
for the municipality.
The trial judge held in his conclusions of
law that the ordinance was validly promulgated and that "[i]t was not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the city
failed to comply with the provisions of section 10-9-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the
promulgation of the ordinance." This conclusion was supported by the court's finding of fact No. 22:
Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance,
the governing body of the City conducted
a public hearing in which an overall master plan for the development of the city
was discussed. This hearing (held in August 1974) was conducted in the West
Jordan school auditorium so as to accommodate the large number of citizens in
attendance. The specific concept of
flood control and having an impact fee
paid by new developers was discussed at
that public hearing. The Ordinance was
prepared by the West Jordan Planning
and Zoning Commission, even though the

City Attorney was responsible for the
selection of the actual language used in
the text of the Ordinance. The plaintiffs
submitted no evidence to show that a
public hearing was not held or that the
Planning and Zoning Commission did not
prepare the Ordinance.
We need not rule on the accuracy of this
finding to resolve the issues presented in
this case. Nevertheless, we are free to
substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court on the issue of law as to whether these facts satisfy the requirements of
section 10-9-25. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d
585 (Utah 1982), Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts,
Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). As mentioned above, the pretrial order placed upon
West Jordan the burden of making a prima
facie showing that it had satisfied the requirements of section 10-9-25. We hold as
a matter of law that it failed to carry this
burden.
Some months prior to the August 1974
public hearing, the West Jordan Planning
and Zoning Commission had discussed on
numerous occasions the idea of requiring
developers to dedicate a portion of their
subdivision or to pay an equivalent value in
cash for parks and flood control. In fact,
on March 20, 1974, the Commission adopted
a motion to have the city require five percent from subdividers to use for parks. A
month later, after the Commission had exacted the five percent fee from at least one
subdivides the city planner told the Commission that the city had no legal basis to
impose the fee. During this time, a special
committee was preparing the West Jordan
Master Plan. The master plan speaks only
in general terms about the need for parks
and recreational facilities. It also addresses in vague terms who should pay for
capital improvements to the city, hinting
that incoming residents should pay more
than existing residents because "equity in
community improvements are [sic] seldom
fairly shared through taxation." Nothing
in the master plan proposes that developers
either dedicate seven percent of their subdivisions or the cash equivalent as a condition to receiving approval for their plats.

West Jordan asserts, however, that the
"specific concept of flood control and having an impact fee paid by new developers
was discussed" at the public hearing on the
master plan. The minutes of the public
hearing were not introduced as an exhibit,
nor are they included in the record. However, one of the witnesses for West Jordan
testified as to what was in the minutes:
[Mr. Moosman:] [T]he minutes reflect
that Mrs. Schmidt asked [the city planner] concerning what was going on
with the flood control problems. And
perhaps I could read that It would be
quicker.
[The Court] ... Go ahead and read the
pertinent parts. What does Mrs.
Schmidt say?
A. [The witness:] She asked [the city
planner] to tell what the County Flood
Control had in mind for developers in
the—
Q. Yeah. Go ^head.
A. [The city planner] then explained
that each developer must take care of
his own flood water that originates on
his property. They have suggested
catch basins that can be used both for
flood control and recreational use
It is to be observed that an impact fee was
not mentioned. In January 1975, four
months after the master plan public hearing, the city council enacted the ordinance
which imposed the seven percent impact
fee. No evidence of any other public hearing remotely related to the ordinance appears in the record,
[2] One's
imagination
must be
stretched beyond rational limits to accept
the master plan public hearing as satisfying the public hearing requirement of section 10-9-25. The ordinance was not even
drafted until months after the master plan
public hearing. Section 10-9-25 is very
clear in this respect The Commission
must first prepare the regulations, one of
which would provide for the impact fee.
Then a public hearing thereon shall be held
by the legislative body, after which the
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legislative body may adopt said regulations
for the municipality. In requiring a public
hearing, our legislature contemplated that
interested parties would have an opportunity to give their views, pro and con, regarding a specific legislative proposal, and
thereby aid the municipal government in
making its land use decisions. See generally 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976); 8A E. McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1976).
West Jordan also argues that because
the ordinance was adopted at a regularly
scheduled city council meeting which was
open to the public, the public hearing requirement was satisfied. Although the
statute does not specifically address the
required notice, we hold that because the
statute calls for a public hearing our legislature contemplated something more than a
regular city council meeting held, so far as
the record here discloses, without specific
advance notice to the public that the proposed ordinance would be considered. See
1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning
§ 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effective, must alert the public to the nature and
scope of the ordinance that is finally
adopted. Id. at 200. Failure to strictly
follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid. Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133
(Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well
established rule is followed by the great
majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L.
R.2d 449 (1964); see Town of Beverly
Shores Plan Commission v. Ennght, 463
N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required municipality to publish two notices in newspaper within ten days of hearing—ordinance
invalidated where first notice appeared in
newspaper eleven days before hearing);
Kalakowski v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431
A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development
Co. v. Tulsa, 596 P,.2d 1255 (Okla.1979)
(city ordinance establishing flood control
districts invalidated because of failure to
follow statutory requirements). We therefore hold that the West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33, § 9-08(2) (1975), is invalid and
void ab initio.

One further matted must be addressed.
Plaintiffs urge that we reverse the trial
judge's findings denying class action status
to this lawsuit We will reverse a trial
court's decision on class action status only
when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its discretion.
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen,
436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir.1970); 3B J. Moore
& J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice
§ 23.97 (2d ed. 1985); 2 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 7.39 (2d ed. 1985).
In the history of this lawsuit, plaintiffs
requested class action certification on three
different occasions from three different trial judges. All three denied their requests.
Plaintiffs do not assert that the trial court
misapplied the law in denying class action
status. Thus, we shall review the trial
court's decision to determine whether it
abused its discretion.
[3] The trial court found that the "putative class is not so numerous that joinder of
all parties is impracticable." Plaintiffs assert that the size of the class alone mandates that joinder is impracticable. However, size of the class is not solely determinative of impracticability. We acknowledge that there may be instances where
sheer size alone would determine impracticability. One of the salutary effects of
Rule 23, Utah R.Civ.K, is that it allows
access to the courts for numerous claimants to request redress of claims that are
too small to merit the expenses of litigation
on an individual basis. 1 H. Newberg,
Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03 n. 38,
§ 3.06 at 145 (2d ed. 1985). In other instances, the size and membership of the
class may be unknown, which makes joinder impracticable. Hdwever, we are here
dealing with a class wJhose members have
been identified. They are developers engaged in business whose claims are not so
insubstantial that joinder or individual suits
would not merit the cost It is unlikely
that denial of class action status would
preclude them from piirsuing their remedies. See 1 Newberg at 145. Judicial economy would be little Served because the
amount of the claim o^ each class member

would still need to be determined on a^i
individual basis, regardless of class actioh
status. Because of our ruling on the merits of the case, there is no possibility of
inconsistent judgments and no issue of substantial public interest remains. Given the
facts of this case, we cannot hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying
class action status.
We remand this case to the trial court to
enter judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiffs.
I

HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.
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Divorce decree dividing marital property was entered by the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and
husband appealed. The Supreme Court
held that: (1) division of marital property
was eminently fair, (2) making Internal
Revenue Service obligation into husband's
separate debt was not abuse of discretion;
and (3) award of temporary alimony to wife
was not abuse of discretion in view of her
inability to earn income during parties' separation.
Affirmed.

1. Divorce <3=>252.2, 253(4)
Division of marital property was em
nently fair in awarding approximate]
equal equities despite court not finding va
ues of parties' premarital assets and ii
crease in those values after date of mai
riage.
2. Divorce «s=»252.4
In dividing marital property, making
Internal Revenue Service obligation sepa
rate debt of husband was not abuse oi
discretion in light of joint income tax re
turns disclosing that wife's income was
minimal at best
3. Divorce <s=>215
Award of one year of temporary alimony in amount of $350 per month was not
abuse of discretion in view of wife's inability to maintain real estate license or
manage parties' rental properties during
separation due to pendency of divorce.
J. Richard Bell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
George H. Searle, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals
from that portion of the decree dealing
with the distribution of the parties' marital
estate and the award of temporary alimony
to defendant We affirm.
j The parties were married four and oneI half years before they separated. No children were born of the marriage. Both had
been married before and had brought several pieces of real property into the marriage. The trial court awarded plaintiff all
the assets of his two corporations, real
property owned by those corporations, and
a rental unit acquired by the parties during
the marriage. Defendant was awarded the
home she lived in at the time of the divorce,
real property the parties had acquired with
proceeds from her real property holdings,
and property acquired by the parties under
uniform real estate contracts. Plaintiff
was ordered to pay to defendant $350 a

